Solving goals-like proving properties, deciding word problems or resolving constraints-is much easier with some presentations of the underlying theory than with others. What have been called "completion processes", in particular in the study of equational logic, involve finding appropriate presentations of a given theory to more easily solve a given class of problems.
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It is common when defining a theory axiomatically to ask whether the chosen axioms-like Euclid's axiom of parallels-are independent. Dependent axioms are superfluous from the point of view of the theory (set of theorems), so such redundancies can be removed without impacting the theory. One speaks then of independent sets of equations, or of alternative presentations of algebras. In these cases, one is often comparing sets of formulae based simply on number or total size, but more subtle preferences can be imagined.
Mathematics also involves solving equations, or, more generally, sets of constraints. In such a context, one cares about the form of formulae. The process of solving transforms a defining set for the problem into formulae that are in solved form; see [Comon and Kirchner, 2001] . In Gaussian elimination, for example, one begins with a set of linear equalities involving unknowns, and infers solved forms assigning numerical values to each unknown, or most general relations between variables. This corresponds to the point of view that arithmetic is a cheap form of inference, while equation solving is relatively hard. Thus, once one has derived a solved form, it is an easy matter to check whether other linear equalities follow.
Good Presentations
In these examples, as in many others, one is given an axiomatic presentation, and sets up a goal of inferring certain formulae: theorems in Euclidian geometry, in one case; solutions of equations, in the other. In both cases, some presentations of the underlying theory are better suited for the task at hand than others. The goal of the work described here is to define the "best" axiomatic presentation, given a problem-solving task. We compare presentations in terms of the quality of proofs they allow. Our work is, therefore, based on a concept of "good" proofs and our goal is to ground the theory of good proofs.
The archetypical instance of this paradigm consists in finding a rewriting-based decision procedure for the uniform word problem in a given equational theory. In this context, the best proofs are rewrite ("valley") proofs and the best presentation is a terminating Church-Rosser ("convergent") rewrite system (see [Baader and Nipkow, 1998, Dershowitz and Plaisted, 2001, "Terese" (M. Bezem, J. W. Klop and R. de Vrijer, eds.), 2002] ).
Good presentations, good proofs and good inferences are clearly related, but what is the best starting point for developing an aesthetic, unified and useful understanding of them? We promote the thesis that the ideal starting point is the concept of proof orderings. Proof quality is measured via a well-founded proof ordering on the set of all proofs: the smaller in the ordering, the better.
Good Proofs
Consider a naïve example: Suppose we have an equational theory defined by the axioms a = b and b = c. Then a = b = c = b = c and a = b = c are both valid proofs of a = c, but, clearly, the second is better that the first, as it is shorter, and non-circuitous. More generally, in proof theory, one assigns ordinals to proofs and shows that under certain circumstances there exists a "critical" subformula that can be replaced in a way that reduces the ordinal of the proof. These proof-theoretical concepts have been extended to dynamically changing proof systems (see [Dershowitz and Okada, 1988] ).
Here we generalize the proof-ordering method, as used in term rewriting for establishing properties of rewrite-system completion procedures [Bachmair and Dershowitz, 1994] , to an abstract setting of arbitrary proof systems, supplied with an arbitrary ordering of proofs.
Good Inferences
How does a machine go about finding good proofs? Much of the research in automated deduction consists in finding the best inference system for finding the best proofs or best presentations. In addition to correctness and completeness, two other notions are essential here: saturation and redundancy. Since the search spaces are in general huge and their structure unknown a priori, one controls the application of locally defined inference rules by applying rules only up to saturation of the formula set (to insure termination) and up to redundancy (to reduce search). Thus, the dominant point of view in the deduction community is to seek out good inferences and maintain control over them.
Completion processes have been devised in various different contexts, but in rather similar fashion. These include: standard Knuth-Bendix completion [1970] , equational completion [Peterson and Stickel, 1981] , completion in specific algebras (like order-sorted ones [Gnaedig, Kirchner, and Kirchner, 1988] ), inductionless induction (initiated by Musser; see [Kapur and Musser, 1987] ), ordered completion [Lankford, 1975 , Bachmair, Dershowitz, and Plaisted, 1989 , Hsiang and Rusinowitch, 1991 , completion for semantic unification [Dershowitz, 1989, Doggaz and Kirchner, 1991] , to mention a few. The formaliza-tion of the completion mechanism, as well as its correctness and completeness, has been intensively studied, beginning with the seminal work of Gérard Huet [1981] and especially since the introduction of proof orderings in [Bachmair, Dershowitz, and Hsiang, 1986] . The universality of "completion" in automated deduction is further evident in the syntheses of completion and Gröbner basis generation, as in, for example, [Kandri-Rody, Kapur, and Winkler, 1989] .
We provide abstract definitions of saturation and redundancy that are applicable in these, and many other, frameworks.
Canonical Presentations
An interesting feature of the complete set of reductions produced by KnuthBendix completion [1970] and the Gröbner bases produced by Buchberger's algorithm [1985] is that they are unique, regardless of nondeterministic choices made along the way [Dershowitz, Marcus, and Tarlecki, 1988, Metivier, 1983] . In other words, "best presentations" are unique for a given ordering of proofs (usually built from a given term ordering). Our abstract notions are similarly canonical.
Overview
Since we aim to be foundational, starting from a very simple, abstract and universal setting, we define a number of abstract properties of presentations, that is, of arbitrary sets of formulae. Fixing inference and the ordering, we characterize the unique canonical presentation in several ways:
(1) Lemmata that can appear as premises in minimal proofs (Definition 24) (2) Smallest saturated set (Theorem 42) (3) Simplest presentation (Theorem 53) (4) Reduced saturated set (Proposition 61) (5) Non-redundant formulae (Corollary 60) (6) Conclusions of trivial proofs (Corollary 64)
These characterization of the canonical presentation are boxed thus in the following sections.
A collateral contribution of this work is abstract formal definitions of redundancy, saturation, canonicity, completeness, simplicity, and triviality, all of which are fundamental notions in the design, study and analysis of proof search methods.
The next section defines the basics. Section 3 uses proof orderings to define the canonical presentation and Section 4 explains how to reduce presenta-tions. Section 5 introduces the central concept of saturation. Redundancy and its elimination are the subject of Section 6. By introducing a notion of subproof, Section 7 provides an additional, more practical characterization of the canonical presentation. We conclude with a brief discussion of related work.
Proof Systems
We begin with the following structure, which we call an ordered proof system, and which consists of the following five components:
• Proofs P;
• Formulae A;
The crucial point here is the proof ordering, which may be partial. As usual, we use > for ≥ ∩ =. We assume for convenience that the proof ordering only compares proofs with the same conclusion (p ≥ q ⇒ ∆ p = ∆ q), rather than mention this condition each time we have cause to compare proofs. (In Section 7, we explore the implications of an additional subproof relation.)
In this work, we make no assumptions whatsoever as to the way formulae and proofs are described. The formal system used to define the proofs could be inference-based (like for equational logic [Taylor, 1979] ) or the sequent calculus [Girard, Lafont, and Taylor, 1989] ), or grammar-based, or anything else. Of course, the syntax of all proofs should not be confused with the description of "good" proofs. An inference-based description of the latter is the subject of [Bonacina and Dershowitz, 2003 ].
We will use the term presentation to mean a set of formulae, and justification to mean a set of proofs. We reserve the term theory for deductively closed presentations.
Example 1 (Ground Resolution) Consider a propositional ordered binary resolution calculus: Formulae are finite sets of literals; proofs are finite unordered unary-binary trees, with formulae for leaves and literals labelling internal nodes. Propositional constants are (arbitrarily) linearly ordered and proofs are compared using the corresponding recursive path ordering [Dershowitz, 1982] .
On the concrete level, for a literal ,¯ , its negation, and L, L , clauses, a binary node corresponds to the application of binary resolution (called identical resolution in [Dowek, Hardin, and Kirchner, To appear] ), labelled by the name of the literal being resolved:
There are also maximally expensive binary nodes for projections, labelled by
Then, given the presentation B = {a ∨b, b ∨ c,ā ∨c, a}, we have for example the following two proofs of b:
Comparing them, assuming the precedence a < b < c, we see that the first is smaller:
We extend Γ and ∆ to sets of proofs in the standard fashion:
It follows immediately from the definitions that Γ and ∆ are monotonic:
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity of Γ and ∆) For all justifications P and Q:
The set of all proofs using some of the premises, for all presentations A:
For a specific conclusion c ∈ A, we sometimes write:
Lemma 5 For all presentations A:
It follows from these definitions that justifications are monotonic:
Lemma 6 (Monotonicity of Π ) For all presentations A and B and formulae c:
Lemma 7 For all justifications P :
Remark 8 Presentations and justifications are related by the Galois connection formed by Π and Γ with respect to ⊆.
From the previous definitions, it is easy to see that proofs need only what they use, that is:
Lemma 9 For all presentations A,
Proof. By Lemma 5 and monotonicity of Π , Π Γ Π
The pre-image Γ −1 of A are those proofs with exactly A as premises:
We can now define the notion of a "theory" generated by a presentation:
Definition 10 (Theories)
• The theory (or deductive closure) of a presentation A: 
We will assume that these postulates hold for all proof systems considered in this paper.
Remark 11
The Reflexivity Postulate requires in particular that the formal systems used to define proofs include structural weakening rules like a A a (proj)
Useful basic properties of proof systems follow from these postulates. Transitivity of consequences follows from Monotonicity and Closure:
Lemma 12 (Transitivity) For all presentations A, B and C,
Proof. By Monotonicity we have ΘΘA ⊇ ΘB. By Closure we get ΘA ⊇ ΘΘA ⊇ ΘB ⊇ C. P 
Proof. We have one direction already Lemma 5. For the other, consider any formula a. By the Reflexivity Postulate, a ∈ ∆ Γ −1 {a}. So there must be a proof p ∈ Π {a} with premise and conclusion a. In other words, a ∈ Γ p, as required. P Finally, we get that larger presentations mean larger justifications and viceversa:
Lemma 16 For all presentations A and B:
Proof. We have one direction of of the first equivalence by monotonicity of Π . Suppose a ∈ A. There is, by Reflexivity, a proof p ∈ Π a {a} ⊆ Π a A ⊆ Π a B with a as both premise and conclusion. Hence, a ∈ B, yielding the other direction. The second equivalence follows trivially. P
Canonical Systems
Proof orderings allow for minimal proofs, central to our development of a theory of canonical inference. Recall that q < p only holds for proofs p and q with the same conclusion.
Definition 17 (Minimal Proofs) The minimal proofs in a justification P are denoted as follows:
Obviously, for all justifications P ,
Note that the notion of minimal proofs (µΠ ) is not monotonic, as clearly P ⊆ Q does not in general imply that µP ⊆ µQ.
Well-foundedness of the proof ordering means that minimal proofs exist and suffice:
Lemma 18 For all presentations A: The following lemma is useful:
Lemma 21
Proof. The right-to-left direction is easy (by 1). For the other, suppose p ∈ µP . By assumption, p ∈ Q. Consider any q ∈ µQ such that q ≤ p. By assumption, q is also in P . But p is minimal in P . Hence, p = q ∈ µQ. P Now that we know how to define good proofs, we can understand how much one can restrict a presentation without jeopardizing the theory.
Definition 22 (Normal Form Proof ) A proof p is in normal form if it belongs to the set of minimal proofs that allow the use of all theorems as lemmata:
Considering only normal-form proofs does not restrict the theory, as we have:
Lemma 23
Proof. We have (Lemma 14) that ΘA = ∆ Π A; applying this to ΘA we get ΘΘA = ∆ Π ΘA. By Lemmata 13 and 18, we have ΘA = ΘΘA = ∆ Π ΘA = ∆ µΠ ΘA
P

Our main definition is:
Definition 24 (Canonical Presentation) The canonical presentation is the flattened theory:
The canonical presentation contains those formulae that appear as premises of all possible valid minimal proofs:
Reduced Systems
Proof orderings can be lifted to sets of proofs (cf. the Smyth [1977] powerdomain construction), as follows:
Definition 25 (Better Proofs) Justification Q is better than justification P if:
Justifications are similar if:
Proposition 26 Better ( ) is a quasi-order.
It follows from the definitions that these relations are compatible: P Q R S implies P S.
Proposition 27 For all justifications P and Q:
Proof. Well-foundedness ensures that minimal proofs exist, therefore (3) holds.
Implication (4) holds trivially.
Line (5) holds since q < p only holds for proofs p, q with the same conclusion.
Suppose P Q. Trivially, µP P ; by (3), Q µQ; so µP µQ. For the other direction of (6): P µP µQ Q. P Proposition 28 For all presentations A and B:
Proof. Line (7) is a consequence of (5); (8) is a consequence of the monotonicity of Π ; (9) follows from the two previous ones. P
Proposition 29
The relation is a partial ordering on minimal proofs.
Proof. The relation is transitive (Proposition 26)
. Antisymmetry holds since, assuming µP µQ µP and p ∈ µP , there must be a q ∈ µQ and p ∈ µP such that p ≥ q ≥ p . Hence p = p = q. By symmetry, µP = µQ. P Lemma 30 Minimal proofs use the premises of minimal proofs:
Proof. Suppose p ∈ µΠ c A for some c. Then Γ p ⊆ A and p ∈ Π c A . Were there a q ∈ Π c A ⊆ Π A such that q < p, p would not be minimal in Π A.
For the other direction, suppose p ∈ µΠ c A ⊆ Π A, but p is not minimal in Π A. In other words, there is some q ∈ Π c A such that p > q. There must be some r ∈ µΠ c A ⊆ µΠ A such that q ≥ r. This contradicts the minimality of p in Π A . P A presentation A is said to be reduced (or flat) if A = A . For (12), letting B be A in (11), A ≡ A iff A = A , and (10) gives the left side. P Finally, since, by Lemma 31, we have (A ) = (ΘA) = (ΘA) = A , the canonical presentation A cannot be further reduced:
Lemma 31 What is reduced cannot be further reduced:
A = A(A ) = A(13)
Saturated Systems
There are two manners in which a presentation can be said to suffice for normal form proofs:
Definition 34 (Completeness) A presentation A is complete if every theorem has a normal form proof, that is, if
or, equivalently,
Definition 35 (Saturation) A presentation A is saturated -denoted Satur A -if it supports all possible normal form proofs:
It follows from Lemma 21 that:
Lemma 36 A presentation A is saturated iff µΠ A = µΠ ΘA A presentation is complete if it is saturated, but proving the converse (Proposition 41 below) requires an additional hypothesis:
Definition 37 Minimal proofs are unique if for all A ⊆ A and c ∈ A it is the case that
Lemma 38 If minimal proofs are unique, then all of A is needed:
for all presentations A and B.
Proof. By Lemma 20 and monotonicity of Θ:
Then there's a p ∈ µΠ A \ Π B which, by uniqueness, has a conclusion ∆ p / ∈ ∆ Π B = ΘB. P
The following is useful:
Lemma 39 For all presentations A:
Then there is a q ∈ µΠ A ⊆ Π A ⊆ Π ΘA (by Reflexivity) such that p > q. But then p / ∈ µΠ ΘA = µΠ ΘA. P Theorem 40 A presentation A is saturated iff it contains its own canonical presentation A :
and by the definition of saturated, we need to show that µΠ A = µΠ ΘA iff µΠ ΘA ⊆ Π A. By Reflexivity and monotonicity of Π : Π A ⊆ Π ΘA. So, for any minimal proof p ∈ µΠ c A ⊆ Π c ΘA there must be a q ∈ µΠ c ΘA = µΠ c Θ A ⊆ Π c A such that p ≥ q. By minimality, p = q ∈ µΠ ΘA. In other words, µΠ A ⊆ µΠ ΘA. So if µΠ A = µΠ ΘA, then, µΠ ΘA = µΠ A ⊆ Π A.
Suppose now that µΠ ΘA ⊆ Π A. By Lemma 39:
When we enforce equality instead of the one-sided inclusion of the previous theorem, that is, when we consider presentations that are their own canonical presentation, we arrive at the concept of canonical presentations: A presentation A is canonical if A = A .
Proposition 41 A presentation is complete if it is saturated. If minimal proofs are unique, then a presentation is saturated iff it is complete.
Proof. If c ∈ ΘA, then (by Lemma 23) there is a proof q ∈ µΠ ΘA of c. If A is saturated, then (by Theorem 40) Γ q ⊆ Γ µΠ ΘA = A ⊆ A, and q ∈ (Π A ∩ µΠ ΘA), as required for completeness.
For the other direction, by completeness and Lemma 39, for all c ∈ ΘA, µΠ c A∩µΠ c Θ A = ∅. By uniqueness of minimal proofs, |µΠ c A|, |µΠ c Θ A| ≤ 1. Hence, A is saturated, with µΠ c A = µΠ c Θ A for all c. P
We can now state a second characterization of canonical presentations:
Theorem 42
The canonical presentation A is the smallest saturated set:
Thus, the canonical presentation is minimal in the sense that no equivalent proper subset of A is saturated.
Lemma 43 If A is saturated, then every equivalent superset also is:
Example 44 (Ground Resolution -Continued) Consider again the resolution calculus: The canonical presentation for A = {a ∨b, b ∨ c,ā ∨c} includes, in addition, {b ∨ā, a ∨ c,b ∨c}. The canonical basis of B = A ∪ {a} is just {a, b,c}. The canonical basis of B ∪ {c} is the empty clause.
Redundancy
Formulae that when removed from a presentation do not hurt proof quality will be termed "redundant". The concept of redundancy lies at the heart of efficient theorem proving: one seeks to perform inferences on non-redundant formulae so as to avoid redundancy propagation, whose cost could be prohibitive. This "better than" quasi-ordering on proofs is lifted to a "simpler than" quasiordering on (equivalent) sets of formulae, as follows:
Definition 45 (Simpler Presentation) Presentation B is said to be simpler than an equivalent presentation A when B provides better proofs than does A:
Presentations are similar if their proofs are:
Reflexivity and transitivity are inherited from ≡ and . Therefore:
Proposition 46
The relation is a quasi-ordering.
We get easily that:
Lemma 47
Proof. It is always the case that A ΘA A . If A is saturated, then A ⊇ A and, therefore, ΘA A A. For the other direction, suppose p ∈ µΠ ΘA. Since A is similar, there must be a proof q ∈ Π A ⊆ Π ΘA, such that q ≤ p. But q < p, so p ∈ Π A. It follows that µΠ ΘA ⊆ Π A, and A is saturated. P Proposition 49 For all presentations A and B:
Proof. Line (14) is a consequence of (6) 
Definition 54 (Redundancy) A set R of formulae is redundant with respect to a presentation A when:
The set of all redundant formulae of a given presentation A is denoted ρA:
The next result seems remarkable in its reliance on the power of proof orderings: The set of all individually redundant formulae is globally redundant.
Lemma 55
The redundant formulae are redundant:
We show that Π A Π A and conclude using (15). Consider some proof p 1 ∈ Π c A \ Π A . Since there is a redundant r ∈ Γ p 1 ∩ρA, there must be a proof p 2 ∈ Π c (A\{r}) ⊆ Π A such that p 1 ≥ p 2 . But Γ p 2 = Γ p 1 , so p 1 > p 2 . If p 2 / ∈ Π A , then there would also be a p 3 ∈ Π A, such that p 2 > p 3 . Since the proof ordering is well-founded, this cannot go on forever, so there is, in fact, a proof p n ∈ Π c A such that p 1 ≥ p n . P Theorem 56 Redundant formulae are not needed:
On the other hand, let a ∈ A ⊆ A, that is, a ∈ Γ p for some p ∈ µΠ A. Suppose a ∈ ρA, in other words, A A = A \ {a}. So, there must be a proof q ≤ p such that Γ q ⊆ A . Since, then, q = p, we have q < p. Hence, p / ∈ µΠ A, a contradiction. Thus, a / ∈ ρA. P
It follows from Lemma 36 that
Corollary 57 Similar presentations are either both saturated or neither is.
For any two justifications P ⊆ Q, it is always the case that P ∩ µQ ⊆ µP . So:
Lemma 58 For any presentation A:
Hence:
Lemma 59 Similar presentations are either both complete or neither is.
Proof. If A ≈ B, then, by definition, ΘB = ΘA, and, by Lemma 47, µΠ A = µΠ B. So, if A is complete, we get:
Corollary 60
The canonical presentation A is the theory sans redundancies:
Lemma 55 is another corollary.
Proposition 61
A presentation is canonical iff it is saturated and reduced.
Proof. One direction follows immediately from Theorem 42 and Corollary 60. For the other direction, let A be saturated and reduced. We aim to show that A = A . By Proposition 52, A A and the two presentations are equivalent. If A is saturated, then by Theorem 40, A ⊇ A . By (14), for any r ∈ A \ A , A A A \ {r}. But ρA = ∅, since A is reduced, so it cannot be that r ∈ A. In other words, A \ A = ∅, and A is canonical. P
Subproofs
In the operational quest for the best proofs, a fundamental step is to perform localized searches for bad subproofs, which could stand improvement. To that end, we now impose additional structure on proofs: a well-founded subproof (partial) order £. We extend this notation to sets:
and use ¤ for its reflexive closure.
A proof is deemed trivial when its conclusion depends only on itself, that is, if Γ p = {∆ p}, and it is its own only subproof. Every formula admits a trivial proof, by Reflexivity. We denote by a such a trivial proof of a ∈ A and by A, the set of trivial proofs of each a ∈ A.
We will hereinafter assume three things about subproofs:
Postulate D (Trivia) Assumptions are subproofs:
Postulate E (Subproof ) Subproofs use a subset of the assumptions:
for all proofs p and q.
Most significantly,
Postulate F (Replacement) Decreasing a subproof, decreases the whole proof:
for all proofs p, q and q . Proof. Suppose a ∈ A . Then there is some proof p ∈ µΠ A such that p ¤ a. Were a not minimal, then by the Replacement Postulate, neither would p be minimal. So, A ⊆ µΠ A. Clearly A ⊆ A. Hence, A = ∆ A ⊆ ∆ (µΠ A ∩ A).
For the other direction, suppose c ∈ ∆ (µΠ A ∩ A). Then c ∈ Γ (µΠ A ∩ A) ⊆ Γ µΠ A = A . P Substituting the definition of A :
Corollary 64
The canonical presentation A is the set of conclusions of all trivial normal-form proofs:
We have designed an abstract framework for canonical reasoning without assuming anything about the context other than the existence of a well-founded ordering of entities named "proofs". We have striven to attain the highest degree of abstraction possible-yet derive nontrivial result-by maximizing the potential of a fruitful definition of "good proofs".
We have suggested that proof orderings, rather than formula orderings, take center stage in theorem proving with contraction (simplification and deletion of formulae). Given a proof ordering that distinguishes "good proofs" from "bad proofs", it makes sense to define completeness of a set of formulae as the claim that all theorems enjoy a smallest ("best", "normal form") proof. Then an inference system is complete if it has the ability to generate all formulae needed for such ideal proofs. Abstract conditions for inference of complete and saturated presentations, based on the definitions herein, as well as example applications, such as paramodulation and ground completion, are explored in [Bonacina and Dershowitz, 2003 ].
Both saturation and redundancy have been defined in terms of the proof ordering. This appears to be flexible, since it allows small proofs to use large assumptions. Given a formula ordering, one can, of course, choose to compare proofs by simply comparing the multiset of their assumptions. The definition of redundancy in [Bachmair and Ganzinger, 1991] , namely, that an inference is redundant if its conclusion can be inferred from smaller formulae, coincides with ours when proofs are measured first by their maximal assumption. Our definition accords with the one given by Bonacina and Hsiang [1995, Def. 3 .3]-a sentence is redundant if adding it to the set of assumptions does not decrease any minimal proof. (See [Bonacina, 1992, Chap. 2] .)
The concept of saturation in theorem proving, in which superfluous deductions are not necessary for completeness, was suggested by Rusinowitch [1989, pp. 99-100] in the context of a Horn-clause resolution calculus. In our terminology: A presentation was said to be saturated when all inferrible formulae are syntactically subsumed by formulae in the presentation. (See also [Rusinowitch, 1991] .) This concept was refined by Ganzinger [1991, 2001] and Nieuwenhuis and Rubio [2001, pp. 29-42] . These more recent works deem a set saturated if every possible inference is redundant, but use the more general notions of redundancy.
Finally, it bears mentioning that, thanks to the Curry-deBruijn-Howard morphism, one can view a proof p as a term whose type is precisely its conclusion ∆ p. Considering proof orderings would then be related to the definition of an ordering on higher-order terms, as studied, for example, in [Jouannaud and Rubio, 1999] , or, for dependently typed terms, in [Cirstea, Kirchner, and Liquori, 2001, Virga, 1999] .
